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FEDERALIST No 85
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FEDERALIST No. 85

Concluding Remarks

From MCLEAN's Edition, New York.

Wednesday, May 28, 1788

HAMILTON

To the People of the State of New York:

ACCORDING to the formal division of the subject of these papers, announced in my first number, there would appear still to remain for discussion two points: "the analogy of the proposed government to your own State constitution," and "the additional security which its adoption will afford to republican government, to liberty, and to property."

But these heads have been so fully anticipated and exhausted in the progress of the work, that it would now scarcely be possible to do any thing more than repeat, in a more dilated form, what has been heretofore said, which the advanced stage of the question, and the time already spent upon it, conspire to forbid.

It is remarkable, that the resemblance of the plan of the convention to the act which organizes the government of this State holds, not less with regard to many of the supposed defects, than to the real excellences of the former.

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FEDERALIST No 84
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FEDERALIST No. 84

Certain General and Miscellaneous Objections to the Constitution Considered and Answered.

From McLEAN's Edition, New York.

Wednesday, May 28, 1788

HAMILTON

To the People of the State of New York:

IN THE course of the foregoing review of the Constitution, I have taken notice of, and endeavored to answer most of the objections which have appeared against it. There, however, remain a few which either did not fall naturally under any particular head or were forgotten in their proper places.

These shall now be discussed; but as the subject has been drawn into great length, I shall so far consult brevity as to comprise all my observations on these miscellaneous points in a single paper.

The most considerable of the remaining objections is that the plan of the convention contains no bill of rights.

Among other answers given to this, it has been upon different occasions remarked that the constitutions of several of the States are in a similar predicament.

I add that New York is of the number. And yet the opposers of the new system, in this State, who profess an unlimited admiration for its constitution, are among the most intemperate partisans of a bill of rights.

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FEDERALIST No 80
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FEDERALIST No. 80

The Powers of the Judiciary

From McLEAN's Edition, New York.

Wednesday, May 28, 1788.

HAMILTON

To the People of the State of New York:

TO JUDGE with accuracy of the proper extent of the federal judicature, it will be necessary to consider, in the first place, what are its proper objects.

It seems scarcely to admit of controversy, that the judiciary authority of the Union ought to extend to these several descriptions of cases:

1st, to all those which arise out of the laws of the united States, passed in pursuance of their just and constitutional powers of legislation;

2d, to all those which concern the execution of the provisions expressly contained in the articles of Union;

3d, to all those in which the united States are a party;

4th, to all those which involve the PEACE of the CONFEDERACY, whether they relate to the intercourse between the united States and foreign nations, or to that between the States themselves;

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FEDERALIST No 83
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FEDERALIST No. 83

The Judiciary Continued in Relation to Trial by Jury

From MCLEAN's Edition, New York.

Wednesday, May 28, 1788

HAMILTON

To the People of the State of New York:

THE objection to the plan of the convention, which has met with most success in this State, and perhaps in several of the other States, is that relative to the want of a constitutional provision for the trial by jury in civil cases.

The disingenuous form in which this objection is usually stated has been repeatedly adverted to and exposed, but continues to be pursued in all the conversations and writings of the opponents of the plan.

The mere silence of the Constitution in regard to civil causes, is represented as an abolition of the trial by jury, and the declamations to which it has afforded a pretext are artfully calculated to induce a persuasion that this pretended abolition is complete and universal, extending not only to every species of civil, but even to criminal causes.

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FEDERALIST No 79
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FEDERALIST No. 79

The Judiciary Continued

From MCLEAN's Edition, New York.

Wednesday, May 28, 1788

HAMILTON

To the People of the State of New York:

NEXT to permanency in office, nothing can contribute more to the independence of the judges than a fixed provision for their support. The remark made in relation to the President is equally applicable here.

In the general course of human nature, a power over a man's subsistence amounts to a power over his will. And we can never hope to see realized in practice, the complete separation of the judicial from the legislative power, in any system which leaves the former dependent for pecuniary resources on the occasional grants of the latter.

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FEDERALIST No 82
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FEDERALIST No. 82

The Judiciary Continued.

From McLEAN's Edition, New York.

Wednesday, May 28, 1788

HAMILTON

To the People of the State of New York:

THE erection of a new government, whatever care or wisdom may distinguish the work, cannot fail to originate questions of intricacy and nicety; and these may, in a particular manner, be expected to flow from the establishment of a constitution founded upon the total or partial incorporation of a number of distinct sovereignties. 'Tis time only that can mature and perfect so compound a system, can liquidate the meaning of all the parts, and can adjust them to each other in a harmonious and consistent WHOLE.

Such questions, accordingly, have arisen upon the plan proposed by the convention, and particularly concerning the judiciary department. The principal of these respect the situation of the State courts in regard to those causes which are to be submitted to federal jurisdiction.

Is this to be exclusive, or are those courts to possess a concurrent jurisdiction?

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FEDERALIST No 78
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FEDERALIST No. 78

The Judiciary Department

From McLEAN'S Edition, New York.

Wednesday, May 28, 1788

HAMILTON

To the People of the State of New York:

WE PROCEED now to an examination of the judiciary department of the proposed government.

In unfolding the defects of the existing Confederation, the utility and necessity of a federal judicature have been clearly pointed out. It is the less necessary to recapitulate the considerations there urged, as the propriety of the institution in the abstract is not disputed; the only questions which have been raised being relative to the manner of constituting it, and to its extent. To these points, therefore, our observations shall be confined.

The manner of constituting it seems to embrace these several objects:

1st. The mode of appointing the judges.

2d. The tenure by which they are to hold their places.

3d. The partition of the judiciary authority between different courts, and their relations to each other.

First. As to the mode of appointing the judges; this is the same with that of appointing the officers of the Union in general, and has been so fully discussed in the two last numbers, that nothing can be said here which would not be useless repetition.

Second. As to the tenure by which the judges are to hold their places; this chiefly concerns their duration in office; the provisions for their support; the precautions for their responsibility.

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FEDERALIST No 81
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FEDERALIST No. 81

The Judiciary Continued, and the Distribution of the Judicial Authority.

From McLEAN's Edition, New York.

Wednesday, May 28, 1788.

HAMILTON

To the People of the State of New York:

LET US now return to the partition of the judiciary authority between different courts, and their relations to each other.

"The judicial power of the united States is" (by the plan of the convention) "to be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may, from time to time, ordain and establish."1

That there ought to be one court of supreme and final jurisdiction, is a proposition which is not likely to be contested. The reasons for it have been assigned in another place, and are too obvious to need repetition. The only question that seems to have been raised concerning it, is, whether it ought to be a distinct body or a branch of the legislature.

The same contradiction is observable in regard to this matter which has been remarked in several other cases. The very men who object to the Senate as a court of impeachments, on the ground of an improper intermixture of powers, advocate, by implication at least, the propriety of vesting the ultimate decision of all causes, in the whole or in a part of the legislative body.

The arguments, or rather suggestions, upon which this charge is founded, are to this effect:

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FEDERALIST No 77
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FEDERALIST No. 77

The Appointing Power Continued and Other Powers of the Executive Considered.

From The Independent Journal.

Wednesday, April 2, 1788.

HAMILTON

To the People of the State of New York:

IT HAS been mentioned as one of the advantages to be expected from the co-operation of the Senate, in the business of appointments, that it would contribute to the stability of the administration. The consent of that body would be necessary to displace as well as to appoint.

A change of the Chief Magistrate, therefore, would not occasion so violent or so general a revolution in the officers of the government as might be expected, if he were the sole disposer of offices. Where a man in any station had given satisfactory evidence of his fitness for it, a new President would be restrained from attempting a change in favor of a person more agreeable to him, by the apprehension that a discountenance of the Senate might frustrate the attempt, and bring some degree of discredit upon himself.

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The Federalist Papers by James Madison, John Jay and Alexander Hamilton.

 

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